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Abstract
Post 2003, Iran has shown greater apti-
tude than Western states for penetrating 
Iraqi politics and society, producing 
‘smart power’ by manipulating the com-
bination of identity politics, patronage 
networks, and coercion which have 
become prevalent in both. But Iranian 
interference has been a major source of 
grievance for Iraqis since the outbreak 
of the October 2019 popular protests, 
undermining the Islamic Republic’s 
non-coercive influence. This paper situ-
ates Iran’s influence-gaining strategies in 
Iraq within its broader regional foreign 
policy objectives. Focusing on heritage, 
religious authority, charitable activities 
and media broadcasting, the paper draws 
on Arabic and Farsi language social and 
traditional media sources to argue that 
while the Islamic Republic has invested 
in potential sources of ‘soft power’ to 
broadly appeal to Iraqis, it has prioritised 
core support groups whose activities are 
increasingly unpalatable to the public. 
The paper reflects on how international 
actors should respond to current expres-
sions of anti-Iran sentiment in Iraq.
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Executive Summary
• Iran’s core strengths in Iraq lie in its influence over the political elite and predomi-
nantly Shiʿa militias, but also in its ability to work at a grassroots level. The regime 
relies on patronage networks to work through both formal and informal institutions 
which will not easily be dislodged by military operations against Iranian interests and 
actors in Iraq (p. 11–12). 
• Pro-Iranian Iraqi public sentiment has been falling since 2017. Where it exists, it does 
not necessarily suggest approval of Iran’s theocratic system of government, but rather 
appreciation for Iran’s role in defeating ISIL and standing up to the US. Iran’s Iraqi 
allies are consequently emphasising the continued dangers posed by both (p. 12).
• Sanctions increase Tehran’s incentives to rely on pro-Iranian militias in Iraq to count-
er US interests there, particularly as they represent an economical alternative to 
wholescale military deployment (p. 12).
• Iran’s doctrine of wilayat al-faqih lacks a substantive following amongst senior Iraqi 
Shiʿa scholars. But while Iranian allies in Iraq have publicly deferred to Grand Ayatol-
lah Sistani, several have capitalised on his name to raise funds and popularity. Sistani’s 
eventual death will create a vacuum in religious authority which Tehran will likely 
seek to exploit (p. 14–15, p. 17).
• However, Iranian ‘soft power’ in Iraq has been overemphasised. Tehran’s vulnerability 
is apparent in the strategies of its Iraqi client groups, who have sought to associate 
themselves with the protest movement, even as some of their militias have repressed 
it (p. 18).
• The deaths of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis have produced a ‘cha-
risma deficit’ in Iraq’s Shiʿa paramilitary leadership. Whilst polarising figures, both 
held strong appeal for many Shiʿa youth, and the ability of their replacements to com-
mand equal loyalty is doubtful (p. 19).
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Introduction
Iran is often identified as ‘the big winner’ of the 2003 Iraq War. The toppling of the Baʿath 
Party removed the Iranian regime’s longstanding enemy and the new Government of Iraq 
(GoI) established by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) accorded key positions to 
Shiʿa activist figures who were closely connected to the Iranian regime and Revolutionary 
Guard Corps. Over the past 17 years, the Islamic Republic has gained extensive lever-
age over Iraq’s national security and political decision-making at both local and national 
levels. Perhaps more decisive, Iran has permeated grassroots institutions and the informal 
economy in ways that Western allies have neither the ability nor the inclination to do. 
But within Iraq, Iran’s public image has suffered enormously since mass public protests 
broke out across the country in October 2019. Political and security actors backed by Iran 
have been amongst the principal targets of popular allegations of high-level corruption 
and the promulgation of sectarian agendas. Anti-Iranian sentiment has effectively under-
mined the Islamic Republic’s claim that its activities in Iraq are at the behest of the people. 
Violent suppression of protests by Iranian-sponsored militias has laid bare the coercive 
core of Iranian foreign policy, even with respect to its closest regional ally.
In this light, the extent of Iran’s appeal to Iraqis, often ambiguously referred to as its ‘soft 
power’, is questionable. Yet, its control over patronage networks across Iraq appears suf-
ficient to ensure its ongoing influence over both formal and informal institutions of state 
and society.
This paper focuses on Iranian cultural initiatives in Iraq relating to heritage, religious 
authority, charitable networks and the media. It argues that they are integrally connected 
to the coercive and economic dimensions of Iranian intervention, through which Iran 
has sought to amass ‘smart power’: a shrewd, if opportunistic, source of pervasive Iranian 
influence. Prominent anti-Iran sentiment in many of Iraq’s recent anti-government pro-
tests suggests that there are limits to what this type of power can achieve once its core 
components (resisting both perceived US agendas in Iraq and Islamic State’s militancy) 
are spent. For Iran’s geopolitical rivals, its fall in popularity in Iraq poses questions about 
how this could be exploited; but here it is argued that a military offensive on Iranian inter-
ests is unlikely to achieve the desired results.
The paper proceeds with an initial discussion of the Islamic Republic’s regional foreign 
policy objectives and the means at its disposal to achieve them. The fact that Iran’s means 
have been chronically circumscribed has fundamentally influenced its behaviour in the 
region, leading the regime to devote fewer resources to ‘soft’ power and more to ‘smart’ 
power. The second part of the paper argues that this approach has paid dividends in Iraq 
post-2003, where identity politics and patronage networks prevail in both formal and 
informal spheres. Tehran’s investment into political, militant and religious groups has 
given it hefty leverage over Iraq’s societal and political fields, increasing its freedom of 
action and reducing that of its rivals. Yet, Tehran’s association with particular militant 
groups restricts any leeway to increase its overall popularity. The third part analyses Iran’s 
role in four spheres of non-coercive influence: cultural heritage, religious authority, char-
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itable activities and media messaging. Section four reflects on how the US assassinations 
of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis have affected Iran’s policies in Iraq 
amidst popular protests. The conclusion reflects on how international actors, including 
the UK, should respond to Iranian influence in Iraq. The paper’s empirical findings draw 
on analysis of Arabic and Farsi open-source material including public broadcasting, news-
papers and social media websites. 
Iran’s Regional Foreign Policy: Hard, Soft and Smart Power
Iran’s pursuit of cultural initiatives in Iraq since 2003 comes within the broader context 
of its regional foreign policy. The oft-debated question of whether the Islamic Republic 
pursues an offensive or defensive foreign policy is essentially moot. While Ayatollah Kho-
meini advocated ‘exporting the Revolution’ in the first decade of the Republic (1979–89), 
the regime and its economy have been perpetually vulnerable within the international 
system due to hostility from regional and Western governments towards Iran’s model of 
Shiʿa Islamist governance, and the intermittent sanctions placed on it. As a result, since 
Khomeini’s death in 1989, the regime’s primary objective has been to preserve its own 
survival. Many senior figures view the US as an existential threat and hence resisting US 
regional hegemony through both moral and military means supports regime preservation. 
Iran has adopted a flexible approach towards promoting its interests in the Middle 
East. This has involved pursuing bilateral diplomatic and economic relations with some 
regional governments; particularly the Assad regime in Syria since the 1980s, the post-
Baʿathist Iraqi government since 2005, and the Lebanese government (especially since 
Hezbollah assumed a leading role within it in 2019). However, the deep suspicion with 
which US-allied governments have treated Iran has led the regime to focus on developing 
support amongst certain sectors of Arab populations; a process with varying cultural, eco-
nomic and military components. 
Sanctions and economic woes have prevented Iran from matching the conventional mili-
tary might of its rivals.1 The regime has consequently avoided direct military confrontation 
beyond the Iran-Iraq War (1980–8), focusing instead on asymmetric, quasi-‘guerrilla’ 
warfare, designed to resist and disrupt military operations by technologically superior 
enemy forces.2 Over the past 40 years, the IRGC’s Quds Force has trained, equipped, 
and occasionally fought alongside militant factions across the region. Post-2011, the Arab 
uprisings in Syria, Bahrain and Yemen have created a new series of challenges for Iran. 
The regime’s decision to bolster Bashar al-Assad in Syria has cost it deeply in terms of 
1   See Pieter Wezeman and Alexandra Kuimova, ‘Military Spending On Arms Imports by Iran, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and the UAE’, SIPRI (2019); although it is worth noting that Iran’s spending on defence is 
difficult to delineate in the official budget. See Jennifer Chandler, ‘Decoding Iran’s Defence Spending, 
Pitfalls and New Pointers’, IISS Blog, 13 November 2018. Available at https://www.iiss.org/blogs/mili-
tary-balance/2018/11/decode-iran-defence-spending 
2   Amin Saikal, Iran Rising: The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 2019).
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domestic criticism, money, and also manpower. At the same time, the emergence of ISIL 
as a major fighting force in Iraq, Syria and Yemen has presented Iran with a different type 
of guerrilla warfare, as well as reinforcing a sectarian perception of the conflicts, in which 
Iran is cast as the Shiʿa force confronting Sunni Islamist extremism.
Conversely, Iran’s efforts to project non-coercive popular influence in the region are often 
discussed in terms of ‘soft power’, via culture, broadly comprising literature, the arts, reli-
gion; public diplomacy and foreign policy.3
Iranian state diplomacy is officially conducted by the Foreign Affairs Ministry (under the 
watchful eye of the Supreme Leader’s foreign affairs advisor), while public diplomacy 
is coordinated by the Ministry for Culture and Islamic Guidance, whose ruling council 
is appointed by the Supreme Leader. The Ministry’s responsibilities include managing 
the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA); religious endowments and charitable insti-
tutions; pilgrimages; the cultural heritage organisation; informing the world about the 
aspirations of the Islamic revolution, and expanding cultural ties ‘with various nations 
and Muslims and the oppressed people in particular.’4 The Ministry of Intelligence and 
IRGC also implement and monitor strategically oriented cultural initiatives; whilst former 
IRGC officers direct and/or sit on the oversight boards of numerous cultural and charita-
ble organisations.
Despite its efforts, Iran has only ever enjoyed qualified success in promoting its national 
‘brand’ through persuasive means. In the predominantly Sunni Arab world, public opinion 
of the Islamic Republic has proven volatile.5 Approval ratings of the leadership rose 
markedly after Hezbollah took on Israel in the 2006 War, but Iranian sponsorship of pre-
dominantly Shiʿa militant groups in the region since 2011 has stirred broad distrust of 
their geopolitical intentions, lending credibility to the theory that Iran is seeking to create 
a ‘Shiʿa crescent’ of influence across the Middle East. Analysis emanating from the GCC 
states (particularly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) has inflated this impres-
sion, insisting that Iran is attempting to convert client populations to the Khomeinist 
doctrine of wilayat al-faqih (Guardianship of the Jurisprudent).6 
In reality, while Iran has sought to capitalise on commonalities with Arab Shiʿa commu-
3   Joseph Nye, ‘Soft Power’, Foreign Policy 80 (1990): pp. 153–71: 167; Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to 
Success in World Politics (New York, Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5.
4   For a summary of the ministry’s main functions, see: ‘Responsibilities and Organizational Structure of 
Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance’. Available at https://web.archive.org/web/20080803173726/
http://www.iranculture.org/en/nahad/ershad.php 
5   See polling pertaining to Iran in six Arab states for 2008 and 2011 commissioned by the Anwar 
Sadat Chair: Shibley Telhami, ‘2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll’, Sadat Chair for Peace and 
Development at the University of Maryland, 2008. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2012/04/0414_middle_east_telhami.pdf; see also the Pew Research Center’s findings in 2014 
that public opinion of Iran was negative and deteriorating: ‘Iran’s Global Image Largely Negative’, 
Pew Research Center, 18 June 2014. Available at https://www.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/
sites/2/2014/06/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Iran-Report-FINAL-June-18-20141.pdf 
6   E.g. Abdulatif al-Hassan, ‘Alaqa siyasiya bayn Iran wa’l-‘Arab: Jadhurha wa marahilha wa-atwarha’, 
Al-Ubikan li-l-Nashr, 2018.
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nities, it has enjoyed greater success in leveraging support based on anti-US sentiment, 
even amongst predominantly Shiʿa populations. The regime’s pragmatic attitude towards 
regional relations is expressed in the concept of ‘strategic depth’, which senior regime 
figures describe as Iran’s capabilities, support groups and sources of influence in the 
wider region (Islam, Shiʿism, language). The Supreme Leader maintains that ‘Iran must 
use all of the capabilities at its disposal’.7
The perceived need to ‘do whatever it can’ underscores the fact that many of Iran’s cultural 
initiatives have been firmly integrated into other forms of economic and militarised inter-
ventions abroad. Rather than projecting a distinct form of ‘soft power’, Iran is more adept 
at pursuing ‘smart power’, which Joseph Nye describes as ‘the ability to combine the hard 
power of coercion or payment with the soft power of attraction into a successful strategy’.8 
This type of power, whereby Iran makes the most of the limited means at its disposal to 
increase its freedom of action, has found particularly fertile ground in Iraq post-2003.
Navigating Iraqi Politics and Society Post-2003
Iran and Iraq share a 1,458km border and Tehran clearly stands to benefit from strong 
relations with Iraq, which comprises a buffer to Saudi Arabia (a longstanding rival), and a 
bridge to Syria (a longstanding ally) as well as Lebanon (where its greatest ally, Hezbollah, 
is based). Culturally, Iran shares most in common with Iraq. Both countries are predomi-
nantly Shiʿa (around 90 percent in Iran, 65 percent in Iraq), and share over five centuries 
of transnational links as a result, including pilgrimages to shrines and exchanges between 
seminaries in Najaf and Qom, where senior Shiʿa ʿulema are trained. 
From the 1960s, Iran became a refuge for Iraqi Shiʿa dissidents fleeing Baʿath Party rule 
and exiles associated with the Islamic Daʿwa Party and the religious seminary (the Hawza), 
as well as several hundred thousand Iraqis of Iranian origin and Shiʿa Fayli Kurds. More 
Iraqi Shiʿa went to Iran after the Islamic Revolution, during the Iran-Iraq War, and after 
the 1991 popular uprising.9 From 1982, after the establishment of the Supreme Council for 
Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) in exile, the Quds Force undertook the training of its 
paramilitary wing, the Badr Corps. 
The toppling of the Baʿath regime in 2003 presented immediate threats but also lon-
ger-term opportunities for Tehran. The scale of the US-led military intervention alarmed 
the regime; but the system that subsequently emerged enabled Iranian allies to thrive. 
Iraq’s political system is a product of de-Baathification policies endorsed by the CPA, and 
a governance system based on allocation or muhasasa, whereby political posts and public 
sector jobs are divided amongst Iraq’s dominant political parties and their followers. 
7   Ali Khamenei’s speech to Assembly of Experts, ‘Bayanat dar didar ba aʿza-ye majles khebregan-e 
rahbari’, 4 September 2014. Available at https://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=27356 
8   Joseph Nye Jr, ‘Get Smart: Combining hard and soft power’, Foreign Affairs (2009): pp. 160–3.  
9   Elvire Corboz, Guardians of Shi’ism: Sacred Authority and Transnational Family Networks (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2015), p. 83.
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While patronage politics was widespread under Saddam, the CPA established a conso-
ciational division of power, consolidating patronage networks along sectarian lines, and 
establishing the Shiʿa majority as dominant within them. Survival of the post-2003 Iraqi 
system has rested, in varying degrees, on identity politics (or sectarianism), patronage (or 
corruption), and coercion.10 These are currencies with which the Iranian regime, in which 
religious, economic and military hierarchies intermingle, is well-acquainted.
Iran has pursued three core policies in Iraq post-2003, broadly designed to increase its 
own influence whilst reducing that of the US. First, it has nurtured relations with long-
standing political allies: principally members of the Daʿwa Party, Islamic Supreme Council 
in Iraq (ISCI) and Badr, which established itself as an independent political party in 2012.11 
Iran has used connections with these parties, many of whose members secured key posi-
tions in the GoI and, in Badr’s case, the new Iraqi state security forces, to promote its own 
diplomatic, trading, and security interests through ‘official channels’. 
Secondly, Iran has nurtured new paramilitary groups with anti-US and anti-Sunni Isla-
mist militant agendas, and currently supports over a dozen well-known militias (which 
are predominantly, though not exclusively Shiʿa). Beyond promoting military capabilities, 
support has involved providing models for their political, welfare and propaganda wings 
to make them eventually self-sustaining. Some of these groups emerged to fight the Coa-
lition and subsequently Sunni groups during the sectarian violence from 2005–8; others 
were established as part of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), or ‘Hashd’, in 2013–14 
to fight ISIL.12 
Ayatollah Sistani’s fatwa in 2014 encouraging millions of Iraqis to join the PMF legiti-
mated militias connected to Iran, and until his death in January 2020, Qassem Soleimani 
was a regular visitor to Baghdad, initially assisting in the anti-ISIL campaign, and latterly 
coordinating the security forces’ response to the popular protests. Post-ISIL, the formal 
incorporation of the PMF into the Iraqi state security sector under the functional control of 
Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (a pro-Iranian figure whom the US designated a terrorist in 2009) 
further normalised Iran-backed militias. Some of these have asserted control over large 
areas of western and northern Iraq. This has improved their ability to generate income by 
eliciting protection money from local populations, implementing road tariffs, securing 
positions for followers and demanding cuts from business contracts. It has also reduced 
their need for Iranian material support to sustain welfare programmes for supporters. At 
10   Toby Dodge, ‘The Contradictions of Systemic Sectarianism in Iraq’, SEPAD, 26 November 2019. Avail-
able at https://www.sepad.org.uk/announcement/the-contradictions-of-systemic-sectarianism-in-iraq 
11   Prior to 2007, ISCI was known as ‘Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq, but it dropped 
‘Revolution’ in a bid to adopt a more Iraqi nationalist image. Following Abdel ʿAziz al-Hakim’s death 
in 2009, his son Ammar continued to ‘Iraqify’ the party. This was unpopular with Badr leader Hadi 
al-Ameri, who retains close links with the Quds Force, and with some of the ISCI old guard. In 2017, 
Ammar left the ISCI to establish the Hikma (Wisdom) Party ahead of the 2018 elections. Iran has con-
tinued to back Badr and ISCI.
12   For a detailed analysis of the Hashd groups, see Renad Mansour and Faleh Jabar, ‘The Popular Mobil-
isation Forces and Iraq’s Future’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 2018. Available at https://carnegie-mec.
org/2017/04/28/popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810
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the same time, the success of Fatah, a political alliance of militia leaders including Badr, 
Kataʾib Hezbollah, Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq and the Imam Ali Brigades, in the May 2018 elections 
has reinforced Iranian influence in government.
The third policy has been to promote Iran’s image in Iraq more generally through a variety 
of policies on an ad hoc basis, including providing mediatory services to disputing parties, 
restoring shrines in the holy cities, and funding charitable activities and media broadcasting.
Iran has pursued these policies fairly consistently. Nonetheless, several domestic and 
geopolitical events in recent years, including US sanctions since 2018, have reframed the 
conditions of interventions. Iran has weathered international sanctions over the years, but 
those imposed by the Trump Administration have been increasingly relentless.13 Sanctions 
arguably encourage the regime to rely more on pro-Iranian PMF since the latter comprise 
an economical alternative to deploying Iranian forces. While an Iranian military deploy-
ment to Iraq would elicit a decisive US counteroffensive, Iran can deny responsibility for 
attacks by pro-Iranian PMF units on US interests in Iraq. Sanctions increase IRGC influence 
within Iran by forcing greater recourse to the black market, which senior and former officers 
control.14 Moreover, they reduce Iran’s capacity to invest in ‘good will’ projects in Iraq, and 
increase Iranian public criticism of the regime for doing so. This has not prevented Tehran 
from investing in cultural diplomacy, but it has changed how it markets such activities.
While Iran has not invested in Iraq as a ‘nation-state’, it has excelled at building close-knit 
relationships with individual Iraqis based on financial patronage, military expertise and 
identity politics. But while Tehran’s leverage in Iraq is pervasive, it is insufficient to mit-
igate the threat posed by the US, which still enjoys the support of some Iraqi politicians, 
and is heavily vested in the Iraqi economy and military. Tehran is obliged to hedge its bets 
by supporting and at times mediating between factions whose agendas are not necessarily 
in line with its own, but who can disrupt other anti-Iranian agendas.
Iraqi public opinion of Iran has fluctuated. Periodic polling by Al-Mustakella between 
2005 and 2019 suggests that, amongst Iraqi Shiʿa, views on whether Iran is a reliable 
partner roughly correspond to the prevalence of Sunni militant violence, and potentially 
the presence of US and allied forces. Approval ratings shifted from 61% in 2005–6, to 26% 
in 2009–10, to an all-time high of 86% during the ISIS liberation period in 2014–15, to 
49% in 2018–early 2019.15 Polling in late 2019 amongst pro-reform protesters in Baghdad 
and the southern provinces indicated that only 1% trusted Iran (compared with 7% who 
trusted the US, and 30% who trusted the UN).16 This inauspicious record poses questions 
about Iran’s approach to wielding non-coercive influence.
13   Sanctions pushed domestic inflation to over 50 percent in June 2019.
14   E.g. Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, ‘Tougher US sanctions will enrich Iran’s Revolutionary Guards’, Foreign 
Policy, 4 October 2018. Available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/04/irans-revolutionary-guard-
corps-wont-suffer-from-stronger-u-s-sanctions-theyll-benefit-irgc-trump-sanctions/ 
15   Munqith Dagher, ‘Iraq, 16 Years after the Invasion’, Presentation to the Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies, Al-Mustakella for Research, April 2019. See also David Pollock and Ahmed Ali, ‘Iran gets 
negative reviews in Iraq, even from Shiites’, Washington Institute, 4 May 2010. 
16   Munqith Dagher, ‘Iraq’s protests haven’t yet changed the system — but they’re transforming Iraqis’ 
belief in themselves’, Monkey Cage Analysis, 10 December 2019. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/2019/12/10/iraqs-protests-havent-yet-changed-system-theyre-transforming-iraqis-belief-
themselves/
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Iranian Cultural Diplomacy in Iraq
Iran channels cultural initiatives through Iraqi state and non-state institutions, sometimes 
in tandem, sometimes in competition. The elements of Iran’s cultural outreach discussed 
here suggest that Iran has sought to promote broad-based appeal through generally inclu-
sive activities, but also that its main focus has been to consolidate core ‘resistance’ groups 
that possess the necessary welfare and propaganda capabilities to survive public censure. 
Religious Heritage
Pilgrimages between Iran and Iraq post-2003 have formed a core component of formal, 
government-driven cultural exchange. Up to nine million Iranian pilgrims have visited Iraq 
annually since 2003. The most significant event in the Iraqi Shiʿa calendar is the Arbaʿeen 
festival, forty days after the anniversary of the death of Imam Hussein, which regularly 
attracts up to two million Iranians to Karbala. The festival has become a large cultural event 
where Farsi music and books are sold and Iranian charity collection boxes circulated. 
To promote pilgrimages, Iranian charities fund nationals to undertake pilgrimages to Iraq; 
while Iranian government agencies accord employees perks in form of Hajj trips.17 The 
government grants pilgrims favourable currency exchange rates, and in April 2019, the 
Iranian Organisation of Pilgrimage and the Hajj in Iraq negotiated a reciprocal visa waiver 
for Iranian and Iraqi pilgrims. However, even before the COVID-19 crisis, blows to the 
Iranian economy over the past two years have substantially reduced numbers visiting Iraq. 
Iran has been actively refurbishing shrines and facilities in Iraq’s holy cities. Since 2006, 
Iran’s Headquarters for the Restoration of Holy Shrines and Support for Iraq (HRHS) has 
initiated over 200 restoration projects in Najaf, Karbala, Kadhemiya, Samarra, Musayeb 
and Balad. HRHS is headed by an ex-Quds Force officer and several of its projects are 
conducted with the Quds Force construction firm, Khatem al-Anbiya, which the US desig-
nated a terrorist organisation in 2010.18 HRHS coordinates with the GoI, local governorate 
officials, the Shiʿa Awqaf and Iraqi Shiʿa clerics who manage the shrines. According to 
Iraq’s state news agency in 2018, over 4000 Iranians were employed in restoring shrines 
across Iraq.19 While the organisation has not publicised its budget, its website indicates 
that it is funded by governmental, non-governmental and charitable donations, and oper-
ates on a voluntary non-profit basis.20
Religious Authority 
A perennial worry for Western policy-makers has been the prospect of Iran importing Aya-
17   ‘Iran turns Arbaeen ceremony into a political event’, Radio Farda. Available at https://en.radiofarda.
com/a/iran-truns-arbaeen-ceremony-into-a-political-event/29563642.html; ‘IKRA sends 500 pilgrims to 
Iraq’, IKRA, November 2018. Available at http://portal.emdad.ir/fa/newsagency/165117/-اعزام-500-مددجوی
  کمیته-امداد-ایالم-به-مراسم-پیاده-روی-اربعین-در-عراق
18   Amir Toumaj, ‘Quds Force front develops shrine in Iraq’, Long War Journal, 23 September 2016. 
19   ‘The Ambassador receives, at the embassy building, the president and members of the Committee 
for the Reconstruction of Holy Shrines’, Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 May 2019. Available at http://
www.mofa.gov.iq/tehran/?p=995 
20   See HRHS website. Available at http://atabat.org/ 
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tollah Khomeini’s wilayat al-faqih model into Iraq. This would entail persuading Iraqis to 
support the pre-eminence of a Shiʿa religious authority in political decision-making, and 
moreover recognising the authority of Iran’s current Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei 
(or whoever succeeds him).
Tehran has offered sizeable material incentives to promote Khomeini’s teaching in Iraq, 
but with limited success. Amongst Iraqi Shiʿa, the process of choosing the highest source of 
emulation (marjaʿ al-taqlid) is largely determined by how successful high-ranking clerics 
are at developing networks of followers.21 Since 1992, Iraq’s highest source of authority has 
been Grand Ayatollah Sistani, an Iranian by birth who came to Najaf in 1951 and remained 
through Baʿathist rule. Now 88, he is commonly described as a political quietist and oppo-
nent of wilayat al-faqih who believes that a marjaʿ’s legal opinions should be understood 
as advisory. Consequently, speculation over Sistani’s successor often focusses on which 
clerics favour wilayat al-faqih (broadly construed as ‘pro-Khamenei’) and which do not 
(‘anti-Khamenei’).22
In reality, the boundaries between activism and quietism are not clear-cut. Sistani has 
decisively intervened on a handful of occasions into political matters, as have the other 
top three maraʿji in the Najafi Hawza.23 Two of them, Grand Ayatollahs Bashir al-Najafi 
and Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayadh, have rejected Khomeini’s principle that the highest 
source of religious authority should be the head of state, but do believe that a marjaʿ 
should possess legal authority. Moreover, Shiʿa clerical networks are complex, interwoven 
and transnational in nature.24 A marjaʿ, his deputies, or institutions to which he offers his 
blessings may be more or less well disposed to cordial relations with the Iranian regime, 
even if they ultimately reject the Supreme Leader’s application of wilayat al-faqih. 
Over the past ten years, two Iraqi Shiʿa clerics who subscribe to Khamenei’s vision of wilayat 
al-faqih have been mooted as potential candidates to replace Sistani. One was Ayatollah 
Muhammad Mahdi al-Asafi, an Iraqi educated former Daʿwa Party spokesperson who spent 
years in exile in Iran. He returned to Iraq to represent Khamenei, but died in 2015. Another 
was Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, an Iraqi of Iranian origins, educated in Najaf but resident 
in Iran since the revolution and Chief of Iran’s judiciary from 1999–2009. In 2011, Shahroudi 
established an office in Najaf and he was frequently mentioned as a replacement for Sistani 
(and also Khamenei) until he died in December 2018. A number of minor Shiʿa clerics 
are also loyal to Khamenei and mooted to receive Iranian financial support. They include 
Shahroudi’s supporters and clerics associated with pro-Iranian PMF, such as Aladdin Jazari 
from Harakat al-Nujaba, and Muhammad al-Tabatabai from Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq.25 Nonethe-
less, these figures lack significant public stature beyond their immediate followers.
21   Corboz, Guardians of Shi’ism, p. 6.
22   For a more nuanced assessment of succession, see: Elvire Corboz, ‘The Najafi Marja‘iyya in the Age of 
Iran’s Vali-ye Faqih (Guardian Jurist): Can it Resist?’ in Islam in a Changing Middle East: New Analysis of 
Shia Politics (Washington DC: Project on Middle East Political Science, 2017), pp. 10–14. 
23   Grand Ayatollahs Bashir al-Najafi, Muhammad Ishaq al-Fayadh, and Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim.
24   Corboz, Guardians of Shi’ism.
25   Hamdi Malik, ‘Clues to the Identity of Iran’s Next Supreme leader in the back alleys of a holy city’, The 
Washington Post, 2 June 2019; Reidar Visser, ‘Religious allegiances among pro-Iranian special groups in 
Iraq’, CTC Sentinel 4, no. 9 (2011): pp. 5–8.
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Sistani has frequently criticised US and Iranian interference into Iraq and rejected the use 
of the country as a surrogate battleground. Since the popular protests began in October 
2019, however, Iran has been the more obvious offender. Sistani has repeatedly supported 
the right of Iraqis to demand government reform and an end to corruption, and con-
demned the repression of peaceful protestors by elements within the Iraqi security forces. 
Even so, his statements have not directly named Iran, leaving scope for Iran-aligned PMFs 
to associate themselves with protestors. 
Lack of enthusiasm for Khomeini-style governance amongst senior Iraqi clerics and the 
broader population does not remove the prospect of the Islamic Republic intervening into 
the issue of Sistani’s successor. Sistani’s influence in Iraq is unparalleled, and as noted by 
al-Qarawee, a likely scenario after his death is a long period of uncertainty, and further 
factionalism of the religious establishment, during which Iran will have more opportunity 
to influence Iraqi intra-Shiʿa dynamics, primarily through financial incentives.26 
Charitable Diplomacy
Iran has played a complex role in religious charities across Iraq since 2003. Transnational 
religious charity differs from international funding for secular civil society in that faith-based 
organisations generally possess better grassroots networks, enabling them to respond faster 
and more economically in crisis situations.27 Religious networks are more familiar to most 
Iraqis than other types of civil society, having operated, albeit circumspectly, during Sadd-
am’s rule. In addition to raising funds for crises, they commonly fund religious instruction, 
marriage expenses, and welfare for the sick, unemployed, widows and orphans. 
Iran’s regional relief model is to provide health assistance to those injured in battle as well 
as the infirm, welfare aid to widows and orphans, religious education and vocational train-
ing, with the aim of making beneficiaries self-sufficient. The principle arm of this model 
has been the Imam Khomeini Relief Agency (IKRA). Established by Khomeini in 1979 as 
a domestic charity, it expanded to become Iran’s primary relief agency abroad. IKRA has 
been active in Iraq since 2006 and has main offices in Karbala, Basra, Najaf and Kadhim-
iya, with smaller branches in ʿAmara, Kut, Hala, Diwaniyah and Naseriyah. According to 
IKRA–Iraq, the agency was supporting 11,000 people in 2014, including 7000 orphans. It 
offers technical and vocational training in the form of agriculture, sewing and weaving. It 
also has agreements with the Iraqi Ministry of Labour and Ministry of Sport and Youth to 
run vocational courses.28 
In addition to organisations such as IKRA which are ultimately controlled by the Supreme 
Leader’s office, religious charities associated with Iran can be nominally subdivided 
26   Harith Hasan al-Qarawee, ‘Sistani, Iran, and the Future of Shii Clerical Authority in Iraq’, Middle East 
Brief 105, Waltham, MA: Crown Center for Middle East Studies, (2017), pp. 5–7.
27   Nagham El-Karhili & Mohammed Jassem, ‘Muslim NGOs and Sectarianisation’, Al-Maydan, Novem-
ber 2018. Available at https://themaydan.com/2018/11/muslim-ngos-sectarianization/ 
28   ‘More than 200 million tomans of charity fund income in Iraq during the first 5 months of this 
year’, Golestan Agency, 18 August 2014. Available at http://golestan.emdad.ir/fa/newsagency/95098/
بیش-از-200-میلیون-تومان-درآمد-صندوق-صدقات-در-کشور-عراق-طی5--ماهه-نخست-امسال-کمیته-امداد-امام-ره-عراق-از-
 طریق-کمکهای-محلی-به-درجه-خودکفایی-می-رسد
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into three further categories: those pertaining to members of the Iranian religious estab-
lishment which are not directly connected to the regime (for instance, the Basra-based 
Sadeghiyeh Charity, and the Esfehan-based Imam Hussein Charity linked to Sayyid Sadegh 
Shirazi, a prominent Iraqi-Iranian marjaʿ with a transnational network who has strongly 
criticised the Supreme Leader’s interpretation of wilayat al-faqih29); those controlled by 
Iraqis but with Iranian government guidance and/or financial assistance (like those con-
nected to Badr  and more recently-created PMFs); and those that are Iraqi, but receive 
religious donations (khoms and sadaqat) from Iranian citizens. Al-Sistani’s charities fall 
into this category since many Iranians view Sistani as their source of emulation.
In practice, lines between charitable categories are often opaque. Few charities seem ready 
to advertise Iranian funding. Even IKRA’s Iraq representatives stress that it is independent 
from the ‘mother organisation’, and, in recent years, they have also stressed that all funds 
spent in Iraq are raised within the country. In April 2019, the organisation in Iraq appealed 
to Iraqis to donate funds to send relief to areas affected by flooding in Iran, indicating that it 
envisages making Iraq a source of support for Iran as well as vice versa. Several Iraqi chari-
ties which were set up by Iranian-backed PMFs and/or have provided support to such PMFs, 
claim to have letters of approval from Sistani, allowing them to collect khoms in his name.
Since 2014, Shiʿa charities in Iraq have assumed increased prominence after actively 
raising funds for the PMF, their families and displaced populations during the campaign 
against ISIL.30 While some of these charities were already established, others were set up 
specifically in response to the crisis, answering in some cases to Iraqi marajaʿa, and in 
others to particular PMFs, including some of those affiliated to Iran. 
Several Gulf-sponsored reports have sought to expose Iranian charitable endeavours in 
Iraq as fronts for terrorist funding, intelligence monitoring and ideological indoctrination.31 
These cite a 2015 list issued by ‘the Coalition of Sunni Forces’ (an Iraqi tribal association) 
containing 36 Shiʿa organisations which the reports claim are supervised by the IRGC.32 
Whether this is accurate is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the ‘Sunni Forces’ 
reports coincide with the counter-ISIL military campaign, and since several of the PMF 
formed at that time have established links with the IRGC, it is logical that their charitable 
wings would also. 
One allegedly Iranian intelligence-backed charity is the Karbala-based Fatima Zahra insti-
29   ‘The Office of the Eminent Grand Islamic Authority and Jurist, Ayatollah Sayyid Sadiq Shirazi’. 
Available at http://www.english.shirazi.ir/ and http://shiawaves.com/persian/persian/islam/10560-2017-
05-29-17-11-13 
30   See the IKRA Iraq Facebook page. Available at https://www.facebook.com/emdadiraq/ 
31   For instance, Abdullatif Abdurahman al-Hassan, The Political Relationship between Iran and the Arabs: 
Its Roots, Stages and Forms (Riyadh: Obeikan Publishing, 2018). 
32   See, for instance, ‘36 Iranian intelligence institutions operating in Iraq’, Akhbar al-Khaleej, 25 July 
2016. Available at http://akhbar-alkhaleej.com/news/article/1030093; ‘By name... 36 Iranian intelligence 
institutions in Iraq’, Al-Ain, 25 July 2016. Available at https://al-ain.com/article/213396. Another 2017 
article by an Emirati outlet features a similar list of Iranian institutions in Iraq Al-Ain News: ‘Tabara’at 
aytam al-Iraq… Idaa Iraniya jadida li-Tamwil al-Irhab’, 16 November 2017. Available at https://al-ain.com/
article/iraq-iran-donations; and a 2010 article lists 20 other organisations. Available at www.albasrah.
net/ar_articles_2010/0810/3on_040810.htm 
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tute, established in 2016, with branches in Najaf and other southern provinces.33 The 
institute’s Facebook page states its mission as ‘helping the poor and orphans’, and pictures 
members of the Imam Ali Brigades, a PMF known to receive Iranian arms, thanking the 
institute for providing ‘logistical support’.34 In a 2018 interview, the organisation’s director 
noted that during the anti-ISIL campaign the charity raised well over 1 million USD.35 He 
maintained that no funding came from religious or political bodies, but noted that the 
charity benefits from a fatwa by Sistani allowing it to receive khoms, again demonstrating 
the difficulties of categorically distinguishing entities that are ‘pro-Iran’ from those that 
are ‘pro-Sistani’. 
Tehran has struggled to derive widespread recognition for its charitable endeavours in 
Iraq. Economic hardships have made Iranian investment into causes abroad extremely 
unpopular domestically and the regime has minimised advertising its activities in the 
national media. Even in comments to the Iraqi media, Iranian officials emphasise that 
funds are sourced from Iraqi donations, and that Iran’s main contribution is leadership, 
technical expertise, and its relief model.36 The same is true with regard to Iran’s role in 
reconstructing Shiʿa shrines. HRHS officials emphasise that its projects do not drain Iran’s 
resources: according to the director, 80 percent of Iranian donations return to Iran in the 
form of buying materials for use on Iraqi mosques.37 Nonetheless, even where some obfus-
cation of funding is required, Iran has been able to use sympathetic Iraqi media channels 
to advertise its activities. 
Iran’s Media Strategy
Since 2003, Iran has made multiple forays into Arabic language television broadcast-
ing, some of which have been directed specifically towards Iraq. Al-Alam news channel, 
launched during the lead-up to the US invasion of Iraq by the state broadcaster IRIB, 
now has bureaus in Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Tehran. While clearly pro-Iranian, 
al-Alam markets itself as mainstream and non-sectarian. During and immediately after 
the invasion it had widespread viewership due to having greater access to Iraq than other 
satellite channels, but has subsequently declined in popularity. The Beirut-based channel 
al-Mayadeen, launched in 2012, which is widely believed to be funded by the Iranian gov-
33   ‘Mu’assassat Khayriya Wajha li-Muhimat Istikhbariyya’, Al-Arab, 14 November 2019. Available at 
https://alarab.co.uk/مؤسسات-إیران-الخیریة-واجهة-لمهمات-استخباراتیة
34   Available at https://www.facebook.com/FatimaZahraFoundation; one of the institute’s stated services 
was to bury unidentified bodies after the anti-ISIL campaign. In mid-2019, critics of GoI implicated the 
institute in an alleged attempt by Babel Health Directorate to hide evidence of sectarian crimes in Jurf 
al-Sakhr by concealing the identity of Sunni victims of the PMF. Available at https://ultrairaq.ultrasawt.
com/جثث-مقّطعة-تدفن-سًرا-وثائق-وصور-جدیدة-عن-جرف-الصخر-والمغیبین/الترا-عراق/سیاسة 
35   ‘Barzani meets with Sadr in Najaf ’, al-Moharer al-Jadeed, 23 November 2018. Available at https://
web.archive.org/web/20190103093824/http://www.almohareraljadeed.net/2018/11/Mohrr.html (original 
version has been removed, archived version accessed 15 July 2020).
36   ‘Chairman of the Relief Committee: People’s aid to Hazrat Abbas does not go abroad’, Khabar Online, 
25 May 2016. Available at https://www.khabaronline.ir/news/540853/-رئیس-کمیته-امداد-به-حضرت-عباس
کمکهای-مردم-به-خارج-نمی-رود
37 ‘The Ambassador receives, at the embassy building, the president and members of the Committee 
for the Reconstruction of Holy Shrines’, Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 15 May 2019. Available at http://
www.mofa.gov.iq/tehran/?p=995 
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ernment, also covers Iraqi affairs in depth and appears to have drawn some of Al-Alam’s 
Iraqi viewership. Al-Kawthar is the state’s own religious channel, launched in 2006 by IRIB 
and based in Tehran. 
The Iranian Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance has also fostered links with privately 
owned Iraqi Shiʿa channels which have sprung up, and which typically combine news with 
religious programming.38 In July 2019, al-Kawthar signed an MoU to cooperate with the 
private Iraqi Shiʿa satellite channel, al-Naʿeem.39 Al-Naʿeem promulgates the teaching of 
Muhammad al-Yaqubi, a cleric followed by the Shiʿa Islamic Virtue Party, which has pre-
viously criticised Iran’s role in Iraq. Nonetheless, it is feasible that economic practicalities 
trumped ideological quibbles. 
There are few public indications of the degree of financial support that Iraqi channels may 
receive from Iran, although several of the owners and directors are linked to Iran. The 
most popular channels include al-Ghadeer, overseen by Badr leader Hadi al-Ameri; al-Ebaa 
and al-Itijah, both of which are associated with Kataʾib Hezbollah, whose leader was Abu 
Mahdi al-Muhandis; al-Ahad, which is owned by Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazaʿli; 
and Beladi, owned by former foreign minister and Daʿwa member Ibrahim al-Jaʿafari; and 
the Afaq channel affiliated with Nouri al-Maliki.40 Their viewership numbers are debated: 
Facebook ‘likes’ (admittedly a dubious marker, but there is a lack of more reliable figures) 
suggest that the most popular channels have 2–5 million viewers.41 
The channels listed pursue varied editorial lines, some more obviously pro-Iranian than 
others. However, there are similarities in their presentation of popular protests against the 
Iraqi government. A comparison of media coverage of the protests by al-Ghadeer, al-Ebaa, 
and al-Ahad in December 2019 indicated that they continued to emphasise the threat 
posed by ISIL remnants in liberated parts of the country, and the role of their associated 
PMFs in combatting it. Al-Ebaa and al-Ahad made several references to the ongoing ‘Zion-
ist-American’ regional conspiracy, and the threat posed by US forces in Iraq. Conversely, 
all three channels appeared broadly supportive of protests, but highlighted statements 
by Sistani urging protestors not to engage in violence, and statements by al-Muhandis 
and al-Khazaʿli amongst others which suggested that protests in Najaf in particular repre-
sented security threats to Sistani.
38   In an unconfirmed report in July 2015, the Saudi-funded Al-Arab reported that in July 2017, Khame-
nei’s office allegedly earmarked $750,000 for any Iraqi loyal to the principle of wilayat al-faqih who 
established a terrestrial TV station, and $2 million anyone who established a new satellite channel. See: 
Al-Arab, ‘Qanawat fadaʾiya Iraqiya bi-khitaab Irani li-Daʿam Marjaʿiya Khamenei’ (‘Iraqi Satellite Chan-
nels delivering Iranian messaging to support Khamenei’), July 2015. Available at https://alarab.co.uk/
قنوات-فضائیة-عراقیة-بخطاب-إیراني-لدعم-مرجعیة-خامنئي
39   Al-Naʿeem website. Available at http://www.alnaeem.tv/
40   The same Al-Arab article claims that al-Masar al-Awla, Ahl al-Bayt, Imam Hussein, al-Mahdi, al-ʿUqila, 
al-Najba, al-Najaf, al-Karbala, al-Basra, al-Maʿarif, al-Wilaya, Abrar, al-Sadiq, Qamr Bani Hashim, 
al-Muʾad, and al-Awhad receive Iranian funding, and that al-Hujja, al-Hadaya 4, al-Abas, al-Marjaʿiyya, 
al-Baqiya, and al-Zahra, are owned by Iranians in Najaf and Baghdad. 
41   Analysis of al-Ahad by America Abroad Media estimates that the channel has 5–7 million viewers. 
Available at http://www.americaabroadmedia.org/screen-buzz-workshops/al-%E2%80%98ahd-radical-
shi%E2%80%99ite-islamist-channel-iraq-controlled-iran-backed-militia
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Iran in Iraq Post-Soleimani: Assessing the Fallout
The assassinations of the Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani and his longstand-
ing Iraqi associate, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, by US forces in January 2020 has shifted 
popular perceptions of Iran’s role in Iraq in several key respects. Within the fractured Shiʿa 
political elite, the assassinations produced a degree of consensus around the undesirabil-
ity of a US military presence in the country. The Iraqi parliament, minus some Kurdish 
and Sunni MPs, voted to expel US troops from Iraq. While this was not legally binding, 
more significant has been the shift in Muqtada al-Sadr’s position. 
In the 2003–6 period, Sadr’s Mahdi Army received Iranian training and expertise. Sadr 
subsequently developed a more nationalist image, criticising Iranian interference in Iraq 
and attempting to shed his group’s reputation for anti-Sunni sectarian violence. During 
the anti-ISIL campaign, Sadr’s PMF, the Peace Brigades (Sarayat al-Salam) operated 
largely independently from Iran-allied PMF units, and in the 2018 parliamentary election 
campaign, the Sadrists allied with the Iraqi Communist Party on a nationalist platform 
for political reform. His bloc, Saʾirun, won the largest number of seats and has been a 
leading component of the Iraqi government since. Even so, Sadr has attempted to cham-
pion popular demands for political reform and reduced Iranian involvement in Iraq over 
recent years, and until the assassinations, many of his supporters participated in protests 
in Baghdad, Najaf, and the southern provinces. 
After the assassinations, Sadr came down on the Iranian side and called for a ‘million man 
march’ in Baghdad to demand an immediate US withdrawal (though closer to 250,000 
attended). After protestors rejected the Sadrist candidate to succeed Abdul Mahdi as prime 
minister, Sadr withdrew support for the protest movement. The Iraqi press subsequently 
reported that Sadrists in Najaf, Baghdad, Karbala, Diwaniyah, Dhi Qar and Baghdad had 
attacked protestors. 
Consequently, even before coronavirus restrictions on public movement, the assassina-
tions fractured the protest movement. While many demonstrators continued to denounce 
Iranian interference, fears of reprisals by Iranian allies led some to abandon the cause. At 
the same time, amongst Iran’s core support groups in Iraq, the assassinations triggered a 
leadership crisis. Both Soleimani and Muhandis were charismatic figures who, while deeply 
controversial, commanded the admiration of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Shiʿa youth. 
In a system dominated by patronage politics, the importance of individual personalities in 
commanding loyalty cannot be underestimated, and neither of their replacements appear 
to command the same respect. The designated new PMF Chief of Staff, Abu Fadak Abid 
al-Aziz al-Mohammadawi, a founding member of Kataʾib Hezbollah, lacks the mass follow-
ing enjoyed by Muhandis, and has proven unacceptable to four of the PMFs loyal to Sistani.42 
42   ‘Iraq: Four Brigades Break Away from PMF Command’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 23 April 2020. Available at 
https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/2248386/iraq-four-brigades-break-away-pmf-command
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Conclusion and Recommendations
Since 2003, Tehran’s approach to smart power in Iraq has been aimed at the popula-
tion at large, and also to consolidate more restricted support bases. The refurbishment 
of shrines and promotion of relatively mainstream Arabic news channels are examples of 
broad public outreach. To some extent, so too are charitable endeavours. However, the 
potential social capital that these activities might accrue for Iran has been reduced: partly 
by Iranian public pressure on its government to cease funding causes abroad at a time 
of severe domestic economic hardship; partly by media campaigns against Iranian ‘soft 
power’ by political opponents, and partly by the fact that in the aftermath of victory over 
ISIL, Iraqi paramilitary groups allied to Iran have been increasingly viewed as predators 
rather than liberators. The regime’s limited success in using public diplomacy to enamour 
itself to Iraqis, coupled with the financial pressures it faces, has led it to prioritise activities 
that target core support groups. The problem, from a Western policy-maker perspective, is 
that these groups now dominate important aspects of Iraqi politics and society. 
The idea of countering Iranian influence in Iraq presupposes that this influence is nefar-
ious. In fact, courting public approval based on bilateral religious ties and charitable 
diplomacy is broadly recognised by Western liberal democracies as a ‘legitimate’ form of 
soft power, and it is intuitive that Iran and Iraq should share close relations on this basis. 
What the US and its allies primarily object to, however, is Iran’s disregard for ‘proper’ 
interstate protocol: Tehran has treated public and private office as virtually coterminous, 
frequently intervening via informal actors or government officials who can circumvent 
official procedures in order to achieve favourable outcomes. But for its part, the US 
appears to have concluded that short of taking direct military action against Iranian oper-
atives and their paramilitary Iraqi allies in Iraq, it can do little to confront Iranian smart 
power, and has significantly downgraded its diplomatic relations with the GoI. 
The GoI has proven a willing partner in Iran’s cultural expansion, at least in certain 
spheres, whilst the US strike on Soleimani and Muhandis has been highly damaging to the 
US position vis-à-vis the Iraqi government. Clearly, within the fractured GoI there is some 
pushback against Iranian encroachment, and the appointment of Mustafa al-Kadhimi as 
Prime Minister in May 2020 as the Iran/US ‘compromise candidate’ after six months of 
paralysis indicates that even parliamentary condemnation of American conduct has not 
negated US influence over domestic affairs. 
Moreover, SCIRI’s fragmentation and the cleavages within Daʿwa are damaging for Iran. 
Rather than being able to act primarily through two powerful political blocs who could 
together rule Iraq, the regime has cooperated with a proliferation of militia groups who 
possess varying degrees of political clout but who ultimately contribute to instability. 
Iranian influence within the GoI, along with the politicised allocation of public sector 
jobs has been a core source of grievance motivating the Iraqi youth protest movement. 
Protestors have displayed different political inclinations, particularly after the assassina-
tions of Soleimani and Muhandis, but the majority appear to favour an end to cronyism 
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and corruption within public office, as well as objecting to unemployment and inadequate 
public services. In this respect, they favour the same type of transparency and account-
ability within government that Western states seek to promote. However, the US and its 
allies are also widely distrusted within the protest movement and the broader public, and 
the assassinations have created additional dangers for protestors, as pro-Iran groups have 
violently suppressed them in some parts of the country.
This dynamic creates dilemmas regarding how the UK can support the principles champi-
oned by protesters without undermining or endangering them by association. Promoting 
an ongoing international media spotlight on pro-reform activists in Baghdad and the 
southern provinces (even at a time when protests have subsided due to COVID-19) as 
well as giving media platforms to potential emerging leaders within the movement is an 
obvious way of supporting their cause, while also deferring to Iraqi solutions rather than 
attempting to impose grand political bargains at the national level. While the protest 
movement lacks national coordination, activists indicate a clear desire to develop greater 
political agency, and even to contest future elections. These aspirations can be supported 
through the provision of leadership training provided by multilateral agencies such as the 
UN (which does appear to enjoy greater trust), but only if they are grounded in a sober 
assessment of the political environment.
Iraq’s pro-reform protestors are overwhelmingly youthful. Indeed, over 60 percent of 
Iraq’s population is under 25. The public sector accounts for almost half of total employ-
ment, and posts are broadly allocated according to political allegiances. Supporting private 
sector growth beyond the oil industry and providing sustainable jobs (and, crucially, 
benefits packages including pensions) within it based on competitive entry should be a 
priority for Western partners including the UK. At present, the security environment and 
regulatory barriers are hindering the realisation of that goal, and the UK government could 
consider offering incentives and regulatory support to British firms to operate in Iraq.
While these policies do not directly address Iranian influence in Iraq, they do address 
some of the underlying reasons for it. The UK’s positioning vis-à-vis the GoI and indeed 
Iran is bound up with questions over how it intends to deliver aid and carve out foreign 
policy in a post-Brexit era, and particularly the extent to which it is willing to distinguish 
itself from US policy. The UK has been heavily vested in the post-Baʿathist Iraqi political 
process and although public confidence in the GoI is currently low, the government is 
the product of competitive elections. Unwilling to abandon what purchase it has at the 
national level, the UK will likely continue to support the GoI and avoid putting it under 
intense pressure to distance itself from Tehran. Even within these parameters, there are 
areas in which Iraqi ministries can be encouraged to take beneficial action, for instance 
by improving public access to details on funding and management of religious charities, 
some of which are associated with Iran, and further reforming social security and public 
health insurance mechanisms, the inefficiency of which sustains a need for charities to 
provide ad hoc services to the poor.
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Anti-government demonstrators pass by a 
defaced painting of the Iranian flag, during a 
demonstration in Tahrir square, against the 
breach of Iraqi sovereignty by the US and Iran. 
Credit: Ameer Al Mohammedaw/dpa/Alamy 
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